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EMINENT DOMAIN-Taking-Determination of Compensable Interests Through
Classification of Executory Contracts.

Klein v. United States, 375 F.2d

825 (Ct. Cf. 1967).

The Garretts, owners of two tracts of land in Marion
County, Iowa, entered into two five year contracts, one in
January 1962 with Earl Wagner and the other in October
1962 with Jake Klein. The contracts, which were phrased in
terms of leases,' granted to Wagner and Klein the right to
enter upon the land owned by the Garretts and to take, stockpile, and remove gravel; in turn, Wagner and Klein agreed
to pay ten cents for each cubic yard of gravel removed.
One month after the contract between Garrett and Klein
was signed, Cyrus Vance, in his position as Secretary of the
Army, placed his signature on a declaration of taking. As a
consequence the fee simple titles of several tracts of land,
including the two tracts supporting the gravel contracts, were
taken as a part of the Red Rock Reservoir Project. Concurrently, moneys were deposited with the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa as estimated
just compensation.
After the Garretts applied for and received a preliminary
disbursement from the district court, but before the condetonation commission appointed by the district court to make
a final determination could declare its findings on the issue
of just compensation, Klein and Garrett filed separate, identical suits against the United States in the Court of Claims by
petition for summary judgment.2 These cases claimed that
as provided in the just compensation clause of the fifth amendment,' Klein and Garrett were entitled to compensation for
the "taking" of the gravel contracts.4
1. Since interests in land were created by the contracts, it is irrelevant to the
purpose of this note to decide if, in fact, leasehold interests were created.
2. Following a brief period of separateness, the two cases were consolidated
as provided by U.S. Ct. Cl. Rule 47 (a).
3. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. By making their plea to the Court of Claims before the district court
proceedings were finalized, the petitioners raised several procedural questions which are not of direct concern to this note. It is enough for present
purposes to state that district courts have exclusive jurisdiction of any
and all claims at issue in the condemnation case. Brennan v. United States,
153 F. Supp. 377 (Ct. Cl. 1957). In order to avoid the charge that the
Court of Claims was thereby precluded from hearing the case, Garrett and
Klein contended that the contracts were personal property. Thus, they
argued that the taking of the fee simple titles included both the real
property represented by the gravel as well as the personal property repre-
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While cross motions for summary judgment and reply
briefs were being filed in the Court of Claims, the condemnation commission reported to the district court that its findings
indicated the just compensation for the tract supporting
Klein's contract to be $123,345.' This sum, which considered
the values of the acreage, the buildings and improvements,
and the underlying sand and gravel, allowed $6,000 as the
value of the sand and gravel, of which $1,000 was assigned to
Klein's interest. The district court confirmed these findings.
By making the separate claim to the Court of Claims,
Garrett and Klein contended that the value of "taking" had
to include the value of the contract. Basing their figures on
the royalty interest provided in the contract, the anticipated
profit to be made from the sale of the gravel, and the estimated
quantity of gravel, they asserted that Garrett was entitled to
$387,200 and Klein should receive $774,400 for the estimated
3,872,000 cubic yards of underlying sand and gravel. 6
The Court of Claims rejected this argument in holding
that there was not a "taking" of the contracts within the
meaning of the fifth amendment; hence, the government was
under no obligation to compensate. To justify this holding,
sented by the contracts. Viewing the instruments as personal property,
they contended that this interest was not included within the condemnation
cases in the district court, thereby allowing them to make a separate claim
for this element of loss in the Court of Claims.
5. In awarding the figure of $123,345 the commission followed what is known
alternately as the undivided or unencumbered fee rule. It provides that in
valuing a tract of land sustaining multiple interests the court will consider
the land as if it were unencumbered, and then take the separate interests
from that sum. Eagle Lake Improvement Co. v. United States, 160 F.2d
182, 184 (5th Cir. 1947); Cuyahoga County v. United States, 294 F.2d
775, 777 (Ct. Cl. 1961). This rule is not, however, universally applied,
especially when the value of the separate interests greatly exceeds the
value of the fictionalized unencumbered fee. Baltimore v. Latrobe, 101
Md. 621, 61 A. 203 (1905); Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217
U.S. 189 (1910); Comstock v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 254 Ia. 1301,
121 N.W.2d 205 (1963); Knox Lime Co. v. Maine State Hwy. Comm'n, 230
A.2d 814 (Me. 1967). See also 4 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 12.36[l]
12.36[2] (4th ed. 1962) (hereinafter cited as NICHOLS); 1 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN § 112, at 479-80 (2d ed. 1953) (hereinafter
cited as ORGEL).
6. The method of valuation asserted by the petitioners represents the unit rule
method of computation. This rule measures value by multiplying the number
of cubic measuring units (feet, yards, or tons) by a fixed price per unit.
Though it is not a compensation formula employed by many courts, it has
been accepted directly when the court could find no other criterion of
value, and indirectly by courts that state it is not the measure of value,
yet it has a definite bearing on value. For illustrations of the three different
approaches to the unit rule, see Knox Lime Co. v. Maine State Highway
Comm'n, 230 A.2d 814, 827 (Me. 1967) ("so speculative that it must be
rejected"); United States v. 237,500 Acres of Land, 236 F. Supp. 44, 54
(S.D. Cal. 1964) ("no other factor of value"); Comstock v. Iowa State
Hwy. Comm'n, 254 Ia. 1301, 121 N.W.2d 205, 209 (1963) ("definite bearing
on value").
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the court relied on the doctrine of consequential loss as explained in Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States.7 There
the court reasoned that a contract is a set of mutual rights
and obligations as distinct from its subject matter. Therefore,
when the government takes the subject matter of a contract
(in this case, the gravel), yet does not assume the rights and
obligations under the contract, there is no "taking" of the
contract. Rather than being appropriated, the contract is
ended.8 This reasoning, then, leads to the conclusion that the
loss is consequential and non-compensable.
It is the objective of this note to show that in applying
the consequential loss doctrine to the gravel contracts, the
court displayed a sense of confusion over the concept of
eminent domain and its relationship to contracts. As this case
is merely representative of the general confusion found in this
area of law, this note will develop an approach to the relationship based on three schemas, each being a type of contractual
interest and the rights arising therefrom as a result of a condemnation. As applied to the present case, it will be argued
that the court employed reasoning applicable to the third
schema, whereas it should have used the principles found in
the second. When the classification is established and analyzed
in terms of the policy determinants that influence the schematic approach, the law of eminent domain as it relates to
contracts becomes less susceptible to confused holdings.
In providing that the government shall not take private
property without just compensation, the Constitution delineated one element of what is recognized as a dual concept. In
its barest form eminent domain involves both a power and
an obligation, yet the Constitution refers only to the latter,
leaving the power itself implicitly assumed. Though the
federal government is not expressly granted the power to
condemn land, courts have held that such a grant is unnecessary as it is an essential "attribute of sovereignity. ' '9 The
fifth amendment, therefore, merely conditions the power by
7. 261 U.S. 502 (1923).
8. The late Professor Corbin, is referring to Omnia Commercial Co. v. United
States, i.d., stated that the appropriation-ending distinction is "not convincing." 6 CoRriN, CONTRACTS § 1344, 424 n.21 (1962).
9. United States v. 64.88 Acres of Land, 144 F. Supp. 29, 32 (W.D. Pa. 1956),
rev'd on other grounds, 244 F.2d 534 (3d Cir. 1957).
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exercise."0
The dual nature of the concept has established the two
principal policy determinants weighed by the courts in developing this area of the law: 1) Protecting property rights by
compensation, and 2) Allowing the government sufficient
freedom from excessive awards so as not to frustrate necessary public projects." Consequently, courts will gauge the
proper amount of compensation for a particular taking by
reference to the two determinants. Such a tendency is noticeable in the following charge to condemnation commissions:
The "compensation" which is guaranteed by the Constitution is not defined in the constitutional provision. The term means a compensation which is just
and fair both to the owner of the property taken and
the public represented by the condemning authority. 2
Within the framework of these conflicting policy factors, the
scope of eminent domain is impressively large. The power to
condemn extends to all private property," whether personal
or real, 4 while the accompanying obligation to compensate
encompasses all those from whom property was taken. Moreover, it is "settled law" that judicial interest applies only to
the question of compensation and, in the absence of fraud,
does not extend to the question of the necessity for a particular taking. 5
10.

11.
12.
13.
14.

15.

It is this condition of compensation which differentiates eminent domain
from the police power to regulate. The concepts, however, tend to merge
in certain situations such as a permanent injunction against a business due
to its non-compliance with air pollution statutes. In such cases the test
proposed by Professor Joseph Sax is helpful. He has characterized a
compensable loss resulting from the exercise of eminent domain as a
"government enhancement of its resource position in its enterprise capacity." Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 63 (1964).
For a general discussion of the influence of these determinants, see Kratovil
& Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policy and Concept, 42 CALIF. L. REv. 596,
597 (1954).
Wilmington Housing Authority v. Harris, 47 Del. 469, 93 A.2d 518, 521
(1952).
United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 465 (1903).
"The constitutional protection against the taking of private property for
public use without just compensation applies equally to personal property."
JAHR, LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 45, at 66-7 (1953)
(hereinafter cited
as JAHR). See also Illinois Cities Water Co. v. Mt. Vernon, 11 Ill.2d 547,
144 N.E.2d 729 (1957).
Brooks v. Shepard, 157 F. Supp. 379, 383 (S.D. Ala. 1957).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol4/iss1/11

4

Schuster: Eminent Domain - Taking - Determination of Compensable Interests

1969

CASE lNOTEs

213

Given this broad power, contract rights are not excluded
from the purview of eminent domain." As between the contracting parties themselves the power in the government to
take property for public use acts as a condition of performance, relieving both parties from obligation under the contract
when the power is exercised." In the normal situation, however, the contracting parties are less interested in the effect
of eminent domain on their mutual rights than they are in
the newly established relationship with the condemning
authority. Faced with the fact that a possibly attractive
contract has been dissolved, they are more interested in their
ability to receive compensation from the government.
As with other forms of property, eminent domain has a
dual nature in relation to contracts. Thus, the government
can take, but, at the same time, it must compensate. "When
contract rights are taken for public use, there is a constitutional right to compensate in the same manner as when other
property rights are taken."'" Though this statement appears
to satisfy the anxiety of the contracting parties, upon closer
examination the word "taken" gains great importance. If
one were to have a contract with another whose ability to
fulfill the contract was defeated by eminent domain proceedings, it would be necessary to prove that a taking had occurred
of the thing in question through the actions of the condemnor.
If this fact could not be established, the government would be
under no obligation to compensate under the provisions of the
fifth amendment. Such was the situation in Klein v. United
States.
The relationship between eminent domain and contracts
can be elucidated by analyzing the types of situations in which
contracts are affected by eminent domain proceedings. A
majority of the cases fall into one of three schemas;
16. Not only are contract rights subject to the federal exercise of eminent
domain, but in addition they are subject to action by the state governments.
A number of cases have been litigated on the issue of the constitutional
provision prohibiting the passage of a state law that impairs the obligation
of contracts. Uniformly, the courts have held that the provision is not a
limitation upon the power of eminent domain. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S.
(12 Wall.) 457 (1870); Cincinatti v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 223 U.S.
390 (1912). See generally, 4 NiCHOLs § 13.33, at 465. The courts base their
conclusion on the theory that the contract is subordinate to the sovereign
power of eminent domain, and that this power acts as an unwritten condition of the contracts. For an illustration of this reasoning, see Cincinatti
v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., id. at 400.
17. See 1 ORGEL § 76, at 328.
18. Petition of Mackie, 5 Mich. Ct. App. 543, 147 N.W.2d 441, 445 (1967).
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1) The condemnor acquires the contract, placing itself
in a position similar to that of an assignee;
2) The condemnor acquires property supporting multiple
interests established by contract; and
3) The condemnor acquires property to which a contract
relates, thus rendering performance impossible.
Each of these schemas will be treated separately, not only in
terms of the rules developed by the courts for each, but also
in terms of the confluence of rules and policy determinants.
The first schema falls clearly within the protection of the
fifth amendment. When one assumes the obligations and
rights of a contract, the courts have stated that there is a
definite taking for which compensation is required."9 It was
this principle that was enunciated in Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v.
0 a case involving the government's requisition
United States,"
of a contract for the construction of a ship. The definite
applicability of the taking principle can be seen in this excerpt
from the opinion written by Mr. Justice Butler: "By its
orders the Fleet Corporation put itself in the shoes of claimant
and took from claimant and appropriated to the use of the
United States all the rights and advantages that an assignee
of the contract would have had.""'
In awarding compensation for an appropriation of a
contract, the courts clearly resolve the policy conflict in favor
of private property rights. This schema, therefore, represents
the most certain instance of compensability, with the other
two being less certain. This heirarchy provides a framework
within which the separate schemas are comprehensible.
The second schema is less pat, standing between the two
extremes of the compensability heirarchy. In dealing with
condemned property that supports multiple interests, the
courts have generally focused on the question of whether a
taking of the separate interests has occurred. To assist the
determination, courts have developed two general rules to
test the compensability of a particular interest. Thus, some
courts hold that in order for one to share in the award with
the owner one must have an "estate" or "interest" in the
19.
20.
21.

United States v. Willis, 164 F.2d 453 (4th Cir. 1947).
265 U.S. 106 (1924).
Id. at 120.
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soil. 2 Other courts have been less stringent, allowing one a
right to compensation if a "direct and actual concrete connection with the specific land" is shown." Using these two
tests, courts have authorized compensation for such diverse
interests as oil and mineral leases,24 appurtenant easements,
way, easements in gross,2 5 and sand and
railroad rights of
26
gravel contracts.
The policy determinants have played an obvious role in
developing the applicable rules within the second schema. In
resolving the conflict between private property rights and
government need, the two tests allow the courts a flexible
standard by which to judge a claim. In addition, a comparison
of the two rules shows that those courts that have adopted the
second test are moving in the direction of private property
rights, thereby evidencing a trend toward greater compensability.
The taking principle is most actively applied to deny
compensation within the third schema. Courts have held that
when, in the lawful exercise of acquiring property for public
use, contracts are destroyed or other business losses are
incurred that are incidentally related to the subject matter
taken, such loss is not a taking and is, therefore, noncompensable.2 7 It is this principle that was employed in
Klein v. United States to defeat the claim that as a separate
item of recovery the contract as personal property should be
compensated. The court relied on Omnia Commercial Co. v.
22. "It is clear that unless petitioner's rights and privileges here amount to an
estate or interest in the lands within the statutory meaning it is not entitled
to share in the award, whatever possible claims it might conceivably have
in some other forum on the basis of a frustrated contract or otherwise."
Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal v. New York, 139 F.2d 1007, 1010 (2d Cir.
1904). See also A. W. Duckett & Co. v. United States, 266, U.S. 149 (1924);
2 NICHOLS § 5.23[7], at 73-4.
23. Deepe v. United States, 103 Colo. 294, 86 P.2d 242, 243 (1938). See 4
NICHOLS § 13.33, at 469-70.
24. Angichiodo v. Cerami, 28 F. Supp. 720 (W.D. La. 1939).
25. See Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal v. New York, 139 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1944).
26. Comstock v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 254 Iowa 1301, 121 N.W.2d 205
(1963).
27. "Undoubtedly, the United States could here have 'taken' plaintiff's personal
property and business, in which case just compensation would be due. But
this was not done. The only taking in the present case was of plaintiff's
real estate and water rights, for which compensation has been fully paid ....
[T]he additional losses claimed in this proceeding are in the nature of
consequential damages, that is to say, they are an 'unintended incident' of
the actual taking." R. J. Widen Co. v. United States, 357 F.2d 988, 993
(Ct. Cl. 1966). See also United States v. Carver, 278 U.S. 294 (1929);
Mullen Benevolent Corp. v. United States, 290 U.S. 89 (1933) ; Cumberland
River Oil Co. v. Commonwealth, 350 S.W.2d 700 (Ky. 1961); 4 NICHOLS
§ 13.33, at 466-69; JAHR § 114, at 157-59.
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United States," a Supreme Court case involving a requisition
by the government of the producing capacity of a steel company. One who held a contract with the company for a specific
amount of steel was denied compensation on the grounds that
the loss was consequential. To support this conclusion the
Court stated that a contract is a set of obligations and rights
wholly apart from the subject matter of the contract. Hence,
when the government took the steel production, it only took
the subject matter of the contract, not the contract itself.
"Plainly, here there was no acquisition of the obligation or
the right to enforce it ....As a result of this lawful governmental action the performance of the contract was rendered
impossible. It was not appropriated but ended." 2
With this schema the compensability heirarchy is completed. Here the policy conflict is resolved in favor of the
government's ability to implement public projects. To achieve
this end, courts have employed the consequential loss doctrine
against the contracting parties, justifying the application
with such statements as damages must be certain,"0 a right
must be capable of valuation,3 ' and, most usually, speculative
damages must be avoided."
The schematic approach to the affect of eminent domain
on contracts serves two important functions. First, it clarifies
the policy determinants which are used by the courts in deciding whether a compensable interest has been taken by the
government. By observing the three schemas consecutively a
heirarchy is discernable, blending from a clear case of a compensability, through a less distinct classification in which the
courts are given sufficient flexibility to award or deny compensation, and finally to a class of cases in which the courts
generally deny compensation. This heirarchy, being the
manifestation of conflicting policies within the law of eminent
domain, is merely representative of the fact that an economic
interest is a property right only if it is a legally protected
interest. As the Supreme Court has observed:
But not all economic interests are "property rights";
only those economic advantages are "rights" which
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502 (1923).
Id. at 510-11.
Puerto Rico v. United States, 132 F.2d 220 (1st Cir. 1942).
Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal v. New York, 139 F.2d 1007, 1011 (2d Cir. 1944).
Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 257 (1934).
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have the law back of them, and only when they are so
recognized may courts compel others to forbear from
interfering with them or to compensate for their
invasion.2
The Court continued by saying the question of whether a particular economic use is a "legally protected interest" is, at
least to some degree, dependent upon whether the conflict is
with a private or a public interest.3 4 Thus, in this area of law,
the conflict between the private and public interest has established a heirarchy of compensability.
The second function served by the schematic approach is
that in classifying the general factual situations that give
rise to questions of compensating a contract for the exercise
of eminent domain, courts will be provided an instrument to
avoid the confusion surrounding eminent domain and contract
rights. In doing so they will be less likely to judge a contract
that establishes a definite interest in the property (schema
42) under consequential loss doctrines (schema $3). Klein
v. United States is an example of a court that made such an
error, and is, therefore, representative of the need for greater
clarity.
In Klein, neither the condemnation commission, the district court, nor the Court of Claims questioned the right of
the gravel contractors to be compensated for the interest in
land created by the contracts. Both Klein and Wagner received awards. This, then, places the case within schema #2
as their rights satisfied either of the two tests developed by
the courts: "estate" of "interest" and "direct and actual
concrete connection." On petition to the Court of Claims it
was contended that the contracts should have been compensated separately as personal property. In hearing this claim,
the court assumed a schema 43 situation, invoked the consequential loss doctrine, and thereby denied compensation. On
the other hand, had the court correctly perceived the contract
in terms of creating a compensable interest in land, it would
not have resorted to a schema $3 argument. Rather than stating the contract was a consequential loss, the court should
have recognized that the contract could only be denied a measure of value, not as a compensable interest. Therefore, in
33. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945).
34. Id. at 503.
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failing to make the distinction, the court erred in not holding
that the claimants had an interest in land created by the
contract, that the district court is given exclusive jurisdiction
of claims in condemnations cases, 5 and that the Court of
Claims, thus, had no jurisdiction to hear a valuation argument which was not presented in the district court. Had the
Court of Claims been able to see the contract in terms of the
schematic approach, it would not have invoked an inappropriate concept, the consequential loss doctrine.
The relationship between eminent domain and contracts
is, therefore, to be found in three general schemas. This
approach is proposed as a means of clarifying an area of law
that has received scant attention, but due to its present confused state is deserving of more. The three schemas should
provide a framework within which a contract may be properly
considered, while the policy determinants can assist courts
in deciding the ultimate question of compensability once the
contract is properly classified.
ROBERT P. SCHUSTER

35. See note 4, supra.
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